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CHILD SNATCHING BY PARENTS: WHAT LEGAL
REMEDIES FOR "FLEE AND PLEA"?
CHARLES J. FLECK*
In our highly mobile society, more and more unsuccessful parents
in child custody proceedings are initiating "self-help" by kidnapping
their own children.' The subsequent searches for the children are fre-
quently nationwide, and occasionally international. 2 This may require
expenditure of vast sums of money for private investigators, travel and
attorney fees. In the absence of legal protection, the parent granted
custody must resort to the same tactics by way of the "snatchback. ' 3
During these "search and snatch missions" the real losers are the chil-
dren who have been used as both sword and shield by the combating
parents. The children are not only the objects of their parents' love but
also the victims of their parents' dislike for one another.
Legal rights become further obfuscated when one parent openly
defies a custody order, takes the child to another state and files a peti-
tion for change of custody. If that court grants a change of custody, the
respective parents will possess separate and conflicting custody decrees.
In arriving at these decrees the courts of different states have relied
upon a variety of inconsistent legal tests, doctrines and decisions.
Consequently, the rights of such parents are in a state of confusion.
The purpose of this article is to trace the decisional trend of custody
awards and their recognition in other states, and to explore new legal
tools at the disposal of lawyers and courts which are designed to deter
and eliminate extralegal child snatching.
* Presiding Judge, Domestic Relations Division, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois;
Elected Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, December 1976; B.A., Northwestern
University; J.D., Valparaiso University School of Law; Member, Illinois Bar; Private practice,
1967-76; Member, Illinois House of Representatives, General Assembly, 1970-76; Member, The
House Judiciary Committee, 1971-76.
1. See, e.g., Moving to Stop Child Snatching, TIME, Feb. 27, 1978, at 85; Peterson, Child
Snatching: The Extralegal Custody Ba/tle After Divorce, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1977, at 36, col. 1.
2. See Bodenheimer, The International Kidnapping of Children: The United Slates Approach,
II FAM. L.Q. 83 (1977).
3. See Molinoff, Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 16, 1977 (Parade Magazine). See also Yuenger,




At early common law "custody" was considered a "property right"
and thus was determined according to property laws. Since the wife's
property vested with her husband upon the marriage, the father was
generally awarded custody of the children when the marriage was dis-
solved.4 The courts assigned little significance to the rights or ability of
the mother or to the child's best interest. The father, viewed as the
legal and natural guardian, could only be denied custody upon a show-
ing of misconduct.5
Subsequent case law and statutes took cognizance of the mother's
important role in child rearing and applied equitable considerations
emphasizing the child's well-being rather than the father's property
rights. 6 Thus, from court decisions the "best interest of the child" rule
evolved.7
However, the trend to adopt the "best interest" rule did not result
in equal consideration being given both parents. In Illinois, for exam-
ple, the best interest test presumed, almost conclusively, that the
mother should be awarded custody. In 1849, the Illinois Supreme
Court in Miner v. Miner8 adopted the "tender years" doctrine. In
Miner, the court stated the existing principle that "[nlext to the right of
the father that of the mother must be recognized,"9 but noted that their
rights were not paramount because they must be weighed against "the
best interest of the child [which] must be primarily consulted."' 0 The
court then assumed that a mother would give more love, affection and
particularly, care to a young child."
4. Cf. King v. Greenhill, II1 Eng. Rep. 922 (K.B. 1836) (where the Court of the King's
Bench in six separate opinions adhered to the common law principle that "[tihe legal power over
infant children is in the father, the mother has none," id. at 926, and that "when a father had the
custody of his children, he is not to be deprived of it except under particular circumstances." Id.
at 927); Exparte Skinner, 27 Rev. R. 710 (C.P. 1824) (where the court refused to interfere with the
father's right to his child who was born in wedlock).
5. In re Spense, 41 Eng. Rep. 937 (Ch. 1847).
6. Exparte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936 (1920) (construing Mo. REV. STAT. § 8304
(1909) (current version at Mo. REV. STAT. § 451.250 (1977)).
7. See Oster, Custody Proceeding." A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAM. L.
21 (1965). For varying state decisions see 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce & Separation § 783 (1966).
8. 11 111. 43 (1849).
9. Id at 49.
10. Id
I1. The Miner court reasoned:
It is upon this consideration that an infant of tender years is generally left with the
mother, (if no objection to her is shown to exist,) even when the father is without blame,
merely because of his inability to bestow upon it that tender care which nature requires,
and which it is the peculiar province of the mother to supply ....
That he has the proper affection for her we may not doubt. . . .Notwithstanding this, it
cannot be expected that he would bestow that personal care and attention upon a girl
seven or eight years old, which may be expected from a mother ....
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The tender years doctrine may have been dictated to the courts by
reason of the cultural milieu of the nineteenth century. Unlike today,
society was not service oriented. The father worked outside the home
in a predominantly "man's world" while the mother labored on the
domestic front, typically a "woman's world." Sexual roles and respon-
sibilities were clearly demarcated with the mother cast as the "child
rearer." Viewed in that attitudinal environment, the tender years doc-
trine did not appear to be the social anomaly it does today.
Illinois courts adhered to the tender years doctrine for over 100
years. Throughout that period many custody cases were decided by
that doctrinal presumption under the guise that it was in the best inter-
est of the child. The common law property discrimination in favor of
the father had been replaced by the tender years bias in favor of the
mother. The legal pendulum of presumptive discrimination had swung
180 degrees.
Recently, in light of rapidly changing sexual roles, courts have
been striking down the tender years doctrine as contravening the best
interest principle,' 2 the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution,' 3 and the equal rights
clause in the Illinois State Constitution.' 4 The best interest of the child
has become the guiding star in custody cases, with the rejection of pre-
sumption in favor of either parent. Despite the present equality in the
law, child snatching continues.
RECOGNITION OF THE CUSTODY DECREE
In part, the child snatching problem was stimulated by the United
States Supreme Court decision in New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 15
which essentially held that the full faith and credit clause does not pre-
clude modification of custody judgments. In that case, the Halveys had
Id at 49-51.
12. Patton v. Armstrong, 16 Ill. App. 3d 881, 307 N.E.2d 178 (1974). The court awarded
custody to the father despite the tender years doctrine. In child custody cases, the "guiding star is
and must be, at all times, the best interest of the child." Id at 882, 307 N.E.2d at 180 (quoting
Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 415-16, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952)).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350
N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fain. Ct. 1973). See also Podell, Peck & First, Custody-To hich Parent? 56
MARQ. L. REV. 51 (1972); Foster & Freed, Child Custody, Part I, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423 (1964);
Potow, Child Custod-The Law and Changing SocialAttitudes, 13 ABA FAM. L. NEWS 11 (Nov.
1972).
14. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18. This section provides:
The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex
by the State or its units of local government and school districts.
See, e.g., Lane v. Lane, 40 I11. App. 3d 229, 352 N.E.2d 19 (1976); King v. Vancil, 34 Ill. App. 3d
831, 341 N.E.2d 65 (1975).
15. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
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resided in the state of New York during most of their marriage. One
year prior to their divorce Mrs. Halvey moved to Florida with their
child. She petitioned for divorce in Florida and served notice on Mr.
Halvey by publication. One day before the decree granting a divorce
and permanent custody was entered, Mr. Halvey "stole" the child and
returned to New York. Mrs. Halvey filed a habeas corpus petition in
New York for return of the child and cited the Florida decree as the
basis for her plea. The trial court awarded custody to the mother.' 6
This decision was affirmed by the appellate division' 7 and the New
York Court of Appeals.' 8 The United States Supreme Court refused to
confront the paramount issue of whether the state which has jurisdic-
tion over the person of the child must grant full faith and credit to a
custody decree rendered in another state. Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, set down the now famous statement that "[s]o far as the
Full Faith and Credit Clause is concerned, what Florida could do in
modifying the decree, New York may do."' 9 The Court went on to say:
"[I]t is clear that the State of the forum has at least as much leeway to
disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the
State where it was rendered. ' 20 Thus, the Supreme Court recognized
the general principle that custody decrees are always modifiable when
the best interest and general welfare of the child so require.21
The Halvey decision emphasized the ever-changing facts consid-
ered in applying the best interest test. The best interest of a child may
change from day to day, week to week and month to month. It is only
a matter of degree as to what facts may affect the best interest of a
child. Sudden and aberrant behavior in the custodial parent may inim-
ically affect the child and warrant an immediate change in custody.
Such dramatic changes are easily discernible and the necessity for a
change in custody would be subject to little disagreement among vari-
ous courts. On the other hand, less severe changes in a parent's behav-
ior are vulnerable to subjective and divergent judicial treatment.
Blind adherence to the best interest principle may well permit suc-
cessive child custody hearings. If a parent receives an unfavorable de-
16. 185 Misc. 52, 55 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Trial Ct. 1945).
17. 269 App. Div. 1019, 59 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1945).
18. 295 N.Y. 836, 66 N.E.2d 851 (1946).
19. 330 U.S. at 614.
20. Id at 615. In subsequent cases the Supreme Court has also avoided a definitive ruling on
whether full faith and credit applies to custody judgments. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962);
Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
21. For Illinois cases following this principle see Nye v. Nye, 411 I11. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300
(1952); Jingling v. Trtanj, 99 111. App. 2d 64, 241 N.E.2d 39 (1968); In re Guardianship of Nichols,
70 111. App. 2d 376, 216 N.E.2d 690 (1966).
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cision, he might immediately flee to another state for an instant replay
of the custody hearing. The process would only stop when that parent
has received a favorable decision or has exhausted his time, energy or
money. In addition, once this favorable determination has been ob-
tained, the other parent might repeat the "flee and plea" process.
In order to discourage this "forum shopping," some jurisdictions
have ignored the best interest test. When a defiant parent has brought
the child before a foreign court for a change of custody, it has applied
the "unclean hands" doctrine.22 In doing so, the disobedient parent is
denied a hearing on the merits. In effect, the court enforces the foreign
decree. This doctrine, though it laudably punishes the wrongdoer, does
not consider the child's welfare.
In the case of People ex rel Bukovich v. Bukovich, 23 the Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of unclean hands and placed em-
phasis on the child's welfare by stating:
While the conduct of the mother in flouting the Indiana order
should be neither rewarded or condoned, the paramount considera-
tion must be the welfare of the child, and we do not agree that rul-
ings of the Indiana trial court and the Texas Supreme Court
precluded the Illinois trial court from reaching a different conclu-
sion.24
However, the Bukovich court limited the scope of this decision by fur-
ther stating that:
The courts of Illinois have both the responsibility and the power to
inquire into the right to custody and concomitant best interests of a
child within the jurisdiction where the passage of time since a prior
custody determination of a sister State makes it possible that the cir-
cumstances . . . have substantially changed. 25
Apparently the court has not precluded application of the unclean
hands doctrine when there has not been a sufficient "passage of time."
Presumably after a short period of time, such as a day or a week,
the circumstances would not have materially changed and a hearing on
the petition would be unwarranted. While the "passage of time" doc-
trine eliminates the major drawback to the unclean hands doc-
trine-absolute prohibition of a hearing-it revives the "flee and plea"
22. See Leathers v. Leathers, 162 Cal. App. 2d 768, 328 P.2d 853 (1958); Crocker v. Crocker,
122 Colo. 49, 219 P.2d 311 (1950); Exparte Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419, 174 P.2d 790 (1946); Inre
Leete, 205 Mo. App. 225, 223 S.W. 962 (1920).
23. 39 Il. 2d 76, 233 N.E.2d 382 (1968).
24. Id at 78, 233 N.E.2d at 383.
25. Id at 79, 233 N.E.2d at 384 (emphasis added). See People ex rel Koelsch v. Rone, 3 Inl.
2d 483, 121 N.E.2d 738 (1954); People ex rel. Stockham v. Schaedel, 340 Ill. 560, 173 N.E. 172
(1930).
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problem. All that is required is that enough time has passed since the
original hearing, that changed conditions are possible.
In some states the legislatures have noted the problem of forum
shopping and have enacted statutes limiting the jurisdiction of their
courts in custody cases. Traditionally, all that was required for a court
to have jurisdiction was the physical presence of the child.26 To com-
bat this problem the states have slowly but inexorably moved to adopt
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 27
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 28 was drafted in
1968 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and to date has been adopted by twenty-six states.29 It attempts
to resolve jurisdictional disputes between states on child custody issues.
The purposes of the UCCJA are to:
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of
other states in matters of child custody which have in the past re-
suited in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful ef-
fects on their well-being;
(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the
end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best
decide the case in the interest of the child;
(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take
place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have
the closest connection and where significant evidence concerning his
care, protection, training and personal relationships is most readily
available, and that courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdic-
tion when the child and his family have a closer connection with
another state;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in
the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure
family relationships for the child;
26. See generally 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 889 (1947).
27. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28 (9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 103
(1973)) [hereinafter referred to as the UCCJA].
28. Id
29. ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.010-25.30.910 (1977); ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 8-401 to 8-424 (Supp.
1978-79); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150-5174 (West Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-13-101 to 14-
13-126 (1973); DEL. CODE tit. 13, §§ 1901-1925 (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.1302-61.20
(Supp. 1978); GA. CODE §§ 74-501 to 74-525 (Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to 583-26
(1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 5-1001 to 5-1025 (Supp. 1978); IND. CODE §§ 31-1-11.6-1 to 31-1-I 1.6-24
(Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598A.1-598A.25 (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. §§ 38-1301 to
38-1326 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1700 - 13:1724 (West Supp. 1979); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. §§ 184-207 (1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.651-600.673 (Supp. 1978);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518A.01-518A.25 (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 61-401
to 61-425 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 75-a to 75-z (McKinney Supp. 1978); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-14-01 to 14-14-26 (1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.21-3109.37 (Page
Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.700-109.930 (1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2301-2325
(Purdon Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-14-1 to 15-14-26 (Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 822.01-822.25 (West 1977); Wyo. STAT. §§ 20-5-101 to 20-5-125 (1977).
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(5) deter abductions and unilateral removals of children un-
dertaken to obtain custody awards;
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in
this state insofar as feasible;
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and
other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state and
those of other states concerned with the same child; and
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 30
While the UCCJA attempts to settle jurisdictional disputes, it
leaves to the individual states the determination of the best interest of
the child. As in any uniform act, the effectiveness of the UCCJA does
not depend only on reciprocity, but also on the number of states that
adopt it.3'
The jurisdiction section of the UCCJA is the heart of the Act. It
provides:
(a) A court of this State which is competent to decide child
custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determina-
tion by initial or modification decree if:
(1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time
of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's
home state within 6 months before commencement of the pro-
ceeding and the child is absent from this State because of his
removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for
other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues
to live in this State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this
State assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or
the child and at least one contestant, have a significant
connection with this State, and (ii) there is available in this State
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the
child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency
to protect the child because he has been subjected to or
threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected
(or dependent); or
(4) (i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdic-
tion under prerequisites substantially in accordance with
paragraphs (1), (2), or (3), or another state has declined to exer-
cise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appro-
priate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is
in the best interest of the child that this court assume jurisdic-
iton.
30. UCCJA, supra note 27, at § I.
3 1. The UCCJA has been introduced in every session of the Illinois General Assembly since
1970. It has yet to pass both the House and Senate. As late as 1977, the UCCJA passed the
Illinois House but failed to pass the Senate on third reading. H.B. 1197, 80th Gen. Ass. State of
Ill., reported in [1977] LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS & DIGEST 1798-99.
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(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a),phys-
icalpresence in this State of the child, or of the child and one of the
contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of
this State to make a child custody determination.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a pre-
requisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody.32
The four general tests of jurisdiction are meant to guide courts by
expressly limiting the exercise of jurisdiction in all custody proceed-
ings. No longer is the mere physical presence of the child sufficient to
confer jurisdiction. If the alternative tests produce concurrent jurisdic-
tion with other states, sections 6 and 7 of the UCCJA insure that only
one state hears the matter.33
Section 6 provides that a court shall not exercise its jurisdiction if
there is a similar pending proceeding in which the court has jurisdic-
tion substantially in conformity with the UCCJA. It further provides
for informal communication between the courts where concurrent ju-
risdiction is being exercised in order to decide which is the more appro-
priate forum. Section 7 sets forth the doctrine of inconvenient forum
and the factors a court should consider in applying the doctrine. 34 Its
purpose is to encourage common sense restraints when it appears that
another state is the home state of the child or would be in a better
position to hear the custody case.35
The UCCJA also limits jurisdiction by incorporating the unclean
hands doctrine in section 8(a).36 Section 8(c) empowers the court to
assess travel expenses, attorney and witness fees, and other expenses
against the wrongdoer. 37 This section's "monetary sanctions" provision
adds practical ramifications to an act which is otherwise an academic
workpiece. 38
32. UCCJA, supra note 27, at § 3.
33. See UCCJA, supra note 27, at §§ 6-7 (Commissioners' note).
34. UCCJA, supra note 27, at § 7(c). This section provides:
In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it is in the
interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take
into account the following factors, among others:
(I) if another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(2) if another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or
with the child and one or more of the contestants;
(3) if substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, pro-
tection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in another
state;
(4) if the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate;
and
(5) if the exercise ofjurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any
of the purposes stated in section I.
35. See UCCJA, supra note 27, at § 7 (Commissioners' note).
36. UCCJA, supra note 27, at § 8(a).
37. UCCJA, supra note 27, at § 8(c).
38. See also UCCJA, supra note 27, at § 15(b). This section provides for attorney fees, wit-
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In some states the UCCJA has been adopted only in part. For
instance, in Illinois only section 3, the jurisdiction provision, has been
enacted. 39 This section has been incorporated verbatim into Illinois'
new Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.4°
Tanner v. Smith4' was the first reported case in Illinois to interpret
the "home state" restraint in the jurisdiction section.4 2 In Tanner, a
New Mexico divorce decree was entered on January 5, 1970, wherein
the wife was granted custody. Shortly thereafter the husband moved to
Illinois. On July 1, 1976, the husband took "informal" custody due to
his ex-wife's purported illness. On August 19, 1976, the husband filed
the New Mexico decree in Illinois under the Uniform Enforcement of
Judgments Act 43 and petitioned for a change of custody. On Novem-
ber 1, 1976, the wife filed a special appearance attacking the jurisdic-
tion and requested that the child be returned to her custody.
The trial court found that it had jurisdiction under section 601 of
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act44 but declined
to entertain the petition by applying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.45 The court reasoned that the wife had no contacts or con-
nection with Illinois, the necessary witnesses were available only in
New Mexico, and evidence of the circumstances that existed at the time
the decree was entered was readily available in New Mexico. 46
The appellate court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the hus-
band's petition to register, but for different reasons.47 It held that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction and therefore its application offorum non
conveniens was improper because it presumes that jurisdiction exists
and also that an alternative forum exists. The appellate court directly
held that under section 601 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act, jurisdiction did not lie because on August 18, 1976, the
ness fees, necessary travel and other expenses to be levied against a person violating a custody
decree of another state which must be enforced by the local forum.
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 601 (1977).
40. Id. This section appears in the UCCJA, supra note 27, at § 3, and in the UNIFORM MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401 (9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 460 (1973)), from which the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act is derived. Both of the uniform acts were drafted by
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
41. 61 Ill. App. 3d 456, 378 N.E.2d 166 (1978).
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 601 (1977). See text accompanying note 31, supra.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, §§ 88-105 (1977); UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGE-
MENTS ACT OF 1948 §§ 1-18 (13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 181 (1975)).
44. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 601 (1977).
45. See generally Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L. REV. 380
(1947); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (1929).
46. 61 111. App. 3d at 457-60, 378 N.E.2d at 167-68.
47. Id. at 458-60, 378 N.E.2d at 167-69.
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day before the father had filed under the Uniform Enforcement of
Judgments Act, the child's "home state" was New Mexico. The court
indicated that presence of the child in Illinois alone no longer confers
jurisdiction.48 Moreover, despite the failure of the Illinois Legislature
to enact other sections of the UCCJA, the Tanner court referred to
them extensively in its decision.49
Other courts have also relied on various provisions of the UCCJA
although it had not been adopted by their legislature. In the case of In
re Gitlinj 0 the Minnesota Supreme Court remanded an interstate cus-
tody dispute to the lower court with instructions to decide whether
Minnesota or Illinois had proper jurisdiction by applying the provi-
sions of the UCCJA notwithstanding prior contradictory holdings in
Minnesota. 5' Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court boldly rejected stare
decisis and decisionally adopted the UCCJA for resolving jurisdic-
tional disputes in custody cases.
The UCCJA is a solid proposal which should settle interstate cus-
tody disputes. However, its effect is limited to those cases where a par-
ent actually files a petition for a change of custody. More often than
not, a parent who has kidnapped his child does not file a subsequent
petition for change of custody. The last building he wants to see is a
courthouse. He merely sinks into the anonymity offered by the new
community. In this typical case, private detectives earn their fees by
tracking down the child and effectuating the "snatchback." But these
recoveries are in themselves extra-legal. The legal tools a custodial
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 601 (1977).
49. The court said:
We note that section 601 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act is
section 3 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act verbatim. This uniform act has
been adopted in seventeen states to date. The explanatory material contained in the
Commissioner's [sic] Note to section 3 of the Uniform Act would construe section 3
consistent with the views we have herein expressed regarding the scope and intent of the
jurisdictional standards in child custody determinations. We further note that section 7
of the Uniform Act provides for the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
(entitled "Inconvenient Forum") by a court which has jurisdiction but which determines
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. Although the uniform act has
not been adopted in this state, it would appear that the provisions of section 601 of the
Illinois Act evince a legislative intent to avoid painful interstate disputes on the issues of
child custody.
61 111. App. 3d at 460, 378 N.E.2d at 168.
50. 304 Minn. 510, 232 N.W.2d 214 (1975).
51. The Minnesota Supreme Court's judicial legislating was an apparent attempt to bring
conformity and predictability into these conflicts. The court made clear its intentions when it said:
In deciding the matter before us we do not utilize our prior decisions on the subject.
And, in effect, we do not decide the questions of jurisdiction put squarely before us.
What we do is to hold that the principles and the appropriate provisions of the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act should be applied to this case.
Id at 521-22, 232 N.W.2d at 221-22. For prior Minnesota decisions see, e.g., Ray v. Ray, 299
Minn. 192, 217 N.W.2d 492 (1974); Barker v. Barker, 286 Minn. 314, 176 N.W.2d 99 (1970).
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parent may have at his disposal are the criminal codes of the various
states.
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR CHILD SNATCHING
Historically, parents were excluded from kidnapping statutes.
52
Even today the Federal Kidnapping Act specifically excludes parents
from its provisions. 53 Despite repeated attempts to expand the Federal
Kidnapping Statute to include parents, Congress has steadfastly main-
tained a "hands off" policy.54
However, the recent rash of child abductions has caused some
states to expand their kidnapping statutes to include parents. 55 Califor-
nia, for example, has supplemented its Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
with a child abduction statute.56 This statute makes it a felony to ab-
duct a child from its parent or guardian or to conceal a child from a
parent with rights of custody.57 The California Legislature attacked
not only custody right violations but also unlawful interference with
visitation rights. 58
The Illinois General Assembly passed a child abduction statute
which was approved by the Governor on August 22, 1978. This statute
provides in part that:
A person commits child abduction when, with intent to violate a
court order awarding custody of a child to another, he or she:
(1) removes the child from Illinois without the consent of the
person lawfully having custody of the child; or
(2) conceals the child within Illinois. 59
52. In Blackstone's commentaries on the Laws of England the offense of Child Stealing is
described as being provided for by the "statute 9 Geo. IV, c.31, 21," which makes it a felony for
"any person maliciously, either by force or fraud .... [to] take away .... entice away, or detain,
any child under the age of ten years, with intent to deprive the parent . . . or any other person
having the lawful . . . charge of such child, of the possession of such child .... " The statute
does not extend to a person claiming "to be the father of an illegitimate child, or to have any right
to the possession of such child, . . . on account of his getting possession of such child, or taking
such child out of the possession of the mother, or any other person having lawful charge thereof."
4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES, Of Public Wrongs. Offences Against the Person, 168 n.26
(1848).
53. 18 U.S.C. 1201(a) (1976).
54. See generally Foster & Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights. The Casefor the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1011 (1977); Stotter, Child Stealing, 18
FAM. L. NEWS LETTER I (1978).
55. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150-5158 (West Supp. 1977).
56. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 278-278.5 (West Supp. 1978).
57. Id at § 278.5(a).
58. Id.
59. Act of Aug. 22, 1978, Pub. A. No. 80-1393, § 10-5, 1978 Ill. Legis Serv. 954 (West). The
child abduction statute provides:
(a) Definitions.
(i) "Court order," as used in this Section, means an order of an Illinois court
having jurisdiction over the person of a child;
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The statute also makes child abduction a class 4 felony which car-
ries with it a sentence of one to three years.60 More importantly, as a
felon, a child abductor is subject to extradition if he flees the jurisdic-
tion of Illinois.61 He would find no sanctuary from legal recourse in
another state. The statute, however, is not without its practical
problems. The question remains unanswered whether the various
states attorneys can or will honor all applications for extradition and
whether they have sufficient manpower or funds to realistically pursue
all requests. Also, prosecutors may be less inclined to extradite fathers
or mothers who abduct their own children than hardened criminals.
This attitude is evidenced by the moderate resolution adopted at the
Twelfth Annual Conference of the National Association of Extradition
Officials, which states:
Each case [of child stealing] should stand on its own merits. Where
appropriate, cooperative efforts should be made to accomplish the
return of both the accused and the child to the demanding state for
civil litigation of the custody dispute.62
With cooperation among litigants, prosecutors and judges, extradi-
tion will be a viable remedy for the snatch and run tactics of disgrun-
tled parents. But if the moral force of the law breaks down and a
parent is intent on violating a custody order, the legal tool available to
prevent an abduction before it occurs may lie in a legal writ that is
(2) "Child", as used in Subsection (b)(1) and (b)(2) means a person under the age
of 14 at the time the violation of this Section is alleged to have occurred.
(b) Offense. A person commits child abduction when, with intent to violate a
court order awarding custody of a child to another, he or she:
(1) removes the child from Illinois without the consent of the person lawfully hav-
ing custody of the child; or
(2) conceals the child within Illinois.
(c) Affirmative Defenses. It shall be an affirmative defense that:
(I) at the time the court order awarding custody of the child to another was en-
tered, the defendant had custody over the child pursuant to a valid order of a court
having jurisdiction over the person of that child; or
(2) after the court order awarding custody of the child to another was entered, the
defendant obtained custody of the child pursuant to the order of a court which had
jurisdiction over the person of that child, and which had been advised of the prior
court order, and which court specifically found the prior court order to be invalid as
a matter of law; or(3) within 72 hours of the alleged violation of this Section, the defendant submit-
ted the child to the jurisdiction of an Illinois court.
(d) Limitations. Nothing contained in this Section shall be construed to limit the
court's civil contempt power.
(e) Penalty. Child abduction is a Class 4 felony.
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(a)(7) (Supp. 1978). See also the provision for an ex-
tended term, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-2(a)(6) (Supp. 1978). For criminal penalties in other
states see, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 12, § 13-1-23 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-301 (1973); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 17, § 2051 (1965); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.10 (McKinney 1975).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 60, §§ 12-49 (1977).
62. Rogers, Is Child Stealing an Extraditable Offense? Address to Thirteenth Annual Confer-
ence, National Assoc. of Extradition Officials, May 24, 1977.
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seldom used but has been a part of English common law and American
law for centuries.
WRIT OF NE ExEAT REPUBLICA
In English practice the writ of ne exeal regno is issued to restrain a
person from leaving the kingdom or the realm.63 It "was originally a
high prerogative writ used by the King to prevent, for reasons of state,
some person from availing himself of the privilege granted freemen by
[the] Magna Charta of going beyond seas without interference .... 64
Similarly, in American practice the writ of ne exeat republica is a proc-
ess arising from chancery jurisdiction and issues on cause shown to re-
strain a party from leaving the state until bail is given.65 The writ is an
extraordinary remedy and actually is an ancillary proceeding to the
main lawsuit.66 Every petition for a writ of ne exeat must show a prob-
able or threatened departure with the intent to evade the jurisdiction.67
It must be the clearest showing because the writ carries with it the dep-
rivation of one's liberty if he fails to make bail.
Writs of ne exeat may be issued pursuant to statutory authority
and by virtue of the court's general chancery powers.68 Illinois has a
statute regulating ne exeat practice.69 Because the statute fails to recite
reasons for issuance of writs the courts have looked to common law
and equitable principles which govern the remedy.70 It has been held
that the writ will issue to insure satisfaction of any legal duty by the
defendant or rightful claim of the plaintiff which would otherwise be
defeated if the defendant were to succeed with his intention to leave the
state.7' The writ also insures that the defendant will attend trial. These
results are safeguarded by detaining the defendant in jail or by requir-
ing him to post bail.72
Custody is a right enforceable by legal process. 73 If one parent
63. See 16 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, Equit)' 1288 (4th ed. 1976).
64. Brophy v. Sheppard, 124 111. App. 512, 516 (1906).
65. Andersen v. Andersen, 315 I11. App. 380, 387, 43 N.E.2d 176, 179 (1942).
66. Nixon v. Nixon, 39 Wis. 2d 391, 158 N.W.2d 919 (1968); Thomas v. E.C. Mutter Constr.
Co., 405 Pa. 509, 177 A.2d 447 (1962); Earles v. Earles, 343 II1. App. 447, 99 N.E.2d 359 (1951).
67. See generally Earles v. Earles, 343 I11. App. 447, 99 N.E.2d 359 (1951); Andersen v. An-
dersen, 315 Il1. App. 380, 43 N.E.2d 176 (1942). However, the writ may issue upon showing prob-
able cause. United States v. Robbins, 235 F. Supp. 353, 357 (E.D. Ark. 1964).
68. Nixon v. Nixon, 39 Wis. 2d 391, 158 N.W.2d 919 (1968).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 97, §§ 1-13 (1977).
70. Earles v. Earles, 343 I11. App. 447, 99 N.E.2d 359 (1951).
71. See, e.g., Tegtmeyer v. Tegtmeyer, 314 Ill. App. 16, 40 N.E.2d 767, cert. denied, 317 U.S.
689 (1942).
72. See, e.g., Andersen v. Andersen, 315 111. App. 380, 43 N.E.2d 176 (1942) (dicta).
73. Szewczyk v. Szewczyk, 320 Ill. App. 562, 51 N.E.2d 801 (1943); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
§§ 601(d)(1), 602(l) (1977); UCCJA, supra note 27, at § 2(1).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
threatens to abduct the children and thereby defeat the other's right to
custody, under equitable principles a writ should issue. Since notice of
the petition would defeat the purpose of the writ, these proceedings are
ex parte.74 Courts therefore have been circumspect in issuing these
writs. Courts require the supporting affidavit or oath with respect to
the material facts and allegations to be more than mere suspicion or
apprehension. 75
Upon issuance, the sheriff serves the defendant and takes him into
custody. If the defendant cannot make the bond endorsed on the writ
he is imprisoned until he is brought before the court. The defendant is
entitled to a full and speedy hearing. If he raises an issue of fact by
denying the threatened abduction and intention to depart from the
state, the writ should be quashed until there is a full hearing.76
Illinois ne exeat practice requires the petition to be supported by
affidavit or sworn testimony.77 If the evidence is sufficient, the judge
must endorse on the petition and the writ the amount of defendant's
bond so that the arresting sheriff and the defendant know the bail re-
quirement. In order to protect against wrongful issuance, the judge
must also set a bond for the plaintiff. If a writ has been improperly
issued against the defendant, he then has an action against plaintiffs
bond for damages and costs wrongfully sustained by reason of the
writ.
7 8
Writs of ne exeat have been widely utilized in divorce actions to
restrain a party threatening to flee the jurisdiction in order to avoid
payment of alimony or child support.79 In view of the dearth of legal
tools to combat child-snatching, a writ of ne exeat is a very effective
legal weapon if the parent with custody has prior knowledge that the
other parent intends to leave the state. Not only could a writ of ne
exeal prevent the actual kidnapping, but it could also spare the custo-
dial parent much time, money and emotional distress. More impor-
tantly, the child would not be subjected to the trauma of dislocation
and concealment. If the courts are truly concerned with the best inter-
est of the child, every available means should be used to bring all con-
cerned parties before the court.
74. See, e.g., Garden City Sand Co. v. Gettins, 102 111. App. 261, af'd, 200 111. 268, 65 N.E.
664 (1902); McGee v. McGee, 8 Ga. 295 (1850).
75. See generally Brophy v. Sheppard, 124 111. App. 512 (1906).
76, Thomas v. E.C. Mutter Constr. Co., 405 Pa. 509, 177 A.2d 447 (1962).
77, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 97, § 5 (1977).
78. Id
79. See, e.g., Andersen v. Andersen, 315 IlL. App. 380, 43 N.E.2d 176 (1942); Earles v. Earles,
343 111. App. 447, 99 N.E.2d 359 (1951).
CHILD SNATCHING
Child snatching is a national (if not international) problem and
must be solved among the states uniformly. Children should not be
torn asunder by an unresponsive legal system or desperate parents lest
the children grow up living the words of Oscar Wilde: "Children begin
by loving their parents; as they grow older they judge them; sometimes
they forgive them."'80
CONCLUSION
Child snatching has become a major problem. The real losers, of
course, are the children. They not only lose needed stability but may
be losing their ability to discern rightful conduct. The extra-legal tac-
tics of child stealing and the snatchback are incongruous with the
child's lessons on right from wrong. Moreover, the legal tactics, at least
in the past, have been inadequate to deal with this problem. The tests
and doctrines applied to determine whether a child's welfare necessi-
tates a change of custody have varied from state to state and have, in
effect, encouraged a parent to forum shop for the most favorable juris-
diction. Uniform laws, such as the UCCJA, can remedy this "market-
ing," but are only as effective as the percentage of states which adopt
them. Legal methods of punishing a disobedient child-stealing parent
are limited by the boundaries of the state and the cooperation of for-
eign states. The only "preventive" legal remedy available to the custo-
dial parent, the writ of ne exeal, is also short of being satisfactory. It is
a fortunate, but rare parent who obtains the knowledge that the non-
custodial parent intends to take the child and run. The only solution to
this problem is concerted action among the states.
80. 0. WILDE, Dorian Grey, in Works of Oscar Wilde 107 (1927).

